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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AMD MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Minnesota corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14109 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSAL AND THE DENIAL OF MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR RELIEF 
FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HONORABLE 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR., JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the insured (The Conti-
nental Bank and Trust Company) to recover against the 
insurer (St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company) 
under a Banker's Blanket Bond for payments made by the ' 
insured in settlement of claims against the insured and 
for its attorneys' fees and costs in defense of said 
claims plus reasonable attorneys' fees and. costs in 
prosecution of this action against the insurer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 24, 1974 the District Court, without 
making findings of fact or conclusions of lav/, granted 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
plaintiff's Complaint (R. 23-24) .£./ On May 12, 1974 the 
District Court, again without making findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, denied with prejudice plaintiff's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from 
Judgment and granted plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories. (R. 8-9) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks (1) to have the District 
Court's orders granting Summary Judgment and dismissing 
the Complaint and denying plaintiff's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment reversed and 
(2) to have the case remanded for a determination by the 
District Court as to whether the plaintiff's good faith 
in making the settlement is at issue and for appropriate 
further proceedings upon such a determination. 
*/ 
— "R. 23-24" refers to pages in the Record of 
this case as filed with the Clerk of this Court on July 1 
1975. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action for recovery of settlement payments, 
attorneys1 fees and costs by The Continental Bank and 
Trust Company (hereinafter "Bank") arises out of the 
settlement of claims against the Bank in Clark Tank Lines 
v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., in the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County. (Civil Action No. 
*/ 
199003).- In the Clark Tank Lines suit, the plaintiffs 
therein, in their Second Amended Complaint, sought damages 
of $650,802.95 against the Bank. (R-E 130-143).— In the 
first two causes of action, plaintiffs alleged that 
J. M. Stoof presented two checks (one for $32,500.00 
and the other for $10,272.22) to the Bank, each drawn on 
accounts of one of the plaintiffs. With respect to each 
such check, plaintiffs alleged that the Bank wrongfully 
~ This settlement with Continental Bank was part of 
a blanket settlement involving four other banks who had 
also been sued by Clark Tank Lines and others for clairfis 
arising out of the activities of J. M. Stoof. See the 
following cases in the District Court of the Third Judi-
cial District in and for Salt Lake County: Clark Tank 
Lines Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, Civil No. 198981; 
Clark Tank Lines Co., Inc. v. Utah Bank & Trust, Civil 
No. 199006; Harms Pacific Transport, Inc. and Clark Tank 
Lines Co., Inc. v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 
Civil No. 199005; Clark Tank Lines Company, Inc. v~ Zions 
First National Bank, Civil No. 199004. (R. 16-17) 
^./"R-E. 130-143" refers to pages in the file in 
Clark Tank Lines v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., Civil 
Action No. 199003 which is an Exhibit in the record before 
this Court. 
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paid or credited the proceeds of the check to J. M. Stoof, 
converted the checks to its own use, had actual knowledge 
that J. M. Stoof had no authority to receive the proceeds 'N 
in 
of the checks and credited the checks to J. M. Stoof in 
bad faith. With respect to the first two causes of action, 
4 
plaintiff prayed for damages against the Bank in the 
amount of $42,722.22. In the Fifth Cause of Action i 
plaintiffs alleged that the Bank aided and abetted J. M. 1 
i 
Stoof in his dealings with respect to said checks and 
i 
transactions and through its acts and omissions prevented 
plaintiffs from learning of the embezzlements and defal-
cations of J. M.. Stoof so that plaintiff could have l 
avoided or minimized their losses from the wrongful acts 1 
of J. M. Stoof. With respect to the Fifth Cause of 
Action, plaintiffs sought general damages against the 
Bank in the amount of $600,000.00. 
During the course of discovery in the Clark 
Tank Lines suit, testimony was given under oath that J. M. 
Stoof obtained, completed and materially altered the 
checks without authorization and through fraudulent 
misrepresentations with the intent to defraud and con-
vert said checks to his'own use. (R. 17) Mr. Robert 
Clark, President of Clark Tank Lines, testified in his 
deposition that the signatories to the $32,500.00 check, 
Mr. Murdock and Mr. Maddux, signed the check in blank 
-4-
and delivered it to J. M. Stoof who wrongfully and with-
out authority filled out the date, amount and payee of 
the check and deposited it in his personal account. 
(R. 17) With regard to the $10,272.22 check, a serious 
evidentiary question arose as to whether the date and 
amount of the check were filled in by Stoof after the 
check was signed by Mr. Robert Clark who instructed Stoof 
to use the check to pay off loans to Mr. Robert Clark 
and D. L. Boulden from Continental Bank. (R. 17) (This 
evidentiary question, of course, was not resolved because 
the lawsuit was settled prior to trial.) Stoof then con-
verted the $10,272.22 check to his own use. (R. 17) J. 
Stoof plead guilty in the United States District Court, 
District of Utah, to 95 counts of embezzlement, thereby 
admitting he had improperly issued and altered checks 
including those for which the Bank was sued by Clark Tank 
*/ 
Lines and used the proceeds for his own user (R# X7) 
Upon Clark Tank Lines1 amendment to its 
Complaint against the Bank to include the specific 
allegation of dishonesty by the Bank, the Bank's counsel 
made oral inquiry of Randon Wilson, one of the attorneys 
for Clark Tank Lines, as to the factual basis for such 
— Details of these transactions may be even more 
available to counsel for St. Paul inasmuch as St. Paul's 
counsel's firm represented Stoof. 
allegation. Bank's counsel was informed by Mr. Wilson 
that in the opinion of Clark Tank Lines' counsel, suffi-
cient evidence existed to justify such an allegation and • 
that they had reason to believe that an employee or 
employees of the Bank had acted dishonestly, but gave no 
specific facts. (R. 18) The lav/suit was settled prior 
to any formal discovery as to the basis for their alle- * 
gations of dishonesty. • 
• 
At all times relevant to the Clark Tank Lines 
i 
suit, Bank was insured by Banker's Blanket Bond No. 
400 CP 5227 issued by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
 m 
Company (hereinafter "St. Paul") (R. 55, 52). The bond * 
provides in part: * 
i 
The St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company 
. . . in consideration of agreed premiums and i 
subject to these Declarations the General 
Conditions of this Bond and the terms and 
limitations expressed in its Insuring Clauses, 
agrees to indemnify the Insured . . . frcir. and 
against any losses sustained by the Insured as i 
the result of any of the occurences or events 
mentioned in the Bond . . . . (R. 62) ' 
Among the "events or occurrences" mentioned in 
* 
the bond are those detailed in Insurance Clause "D": 
i 
The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured 
to any amount not exceeding the amount stated 
in the Declarations for this Insuring Clause, 
or endorsement amendatory thereto, from and 
against any loss through FORGERY OR ALTERATION ' 
of, on or in any checks . . . . (R. 67) 
Also mentioned in the bond are the "events or 
occurrences" detailed in Insuring Clause "A": 
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The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured 
. . . from and against any loss . . . by reason 
of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of 
any of the employees, whenever committed and 
whether acting alone or in collusion with others 
. . . . (R; 66) 
Under both clauses of the bond the limit of 
St. Paul's liability is $2,200,000.00 limited to the ex-
cess of the loss to the Bank over $5,000.00. (R. 56, 43) 
In addition the bond provides: 
The Underwriter will indemnify the 
Insured against court costs and reasonable 
attorneys1 fees incurred and paid by the 
Insured in defending any suit or legal pro-
ceeding brought against the Insured to enforce 
the Insured's liability or alleged liability 
on account of any loss, claim or damage which 
if established against the Insured, would 
constitute a valid and collectible loss sus-
tained by the Insured under the terms of this 
bond. Such indemnity shall be in addition to 
the amount otherwise recoverable under this 
bond. (R. 64) 
St. Paul has admitted that it was kept fully 
informed by the Bank of the proceedings in the Clark Tank 
Lines suit and that on frequent occasions the Bank re-
quested, and St. Paul refused, to assume liability for 
and the defense of the claims against the Bank. (R. 56, 
52) St. Paul also admits that it was informed of the 
settlement proposal. It is undisputed that the Bank settled 
all claims against it in the Clark Tank Lines suit for 
$15,600.00 and expended $13,330.91 in attorneys' fees and 
costs in defense of the claims against it. (R. 56, 52, 53) 
On or about September 22, 1972 the Bank gave St. Paul 
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affirmative proof of loss with full particulars. St. Paul 
denied the Bank's claim. (R. 57, 52, 53) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE NONE OF THE GROUNDS ADVANCED BY DEFENDANT 
ENTITLES IT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The appellant in seeking reversal of the trial 
court's action (and this Court in reviewing that action) 
must labor under the burden created by the trial court's 
failure to set forth its reasons for granting the defen-
dant's motion and denying plaintiff's motion. The trial 
court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law or 
any other statement as to the reasons for its actions; 
it simply granted the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissed each cause of action with prejudice" 
(R. 21-22) and denied plaintiff's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment. (R. 8-9) 
The record before the trial court consisted 
essentially of the Complaint, Answer, and the Bank's 
answers and supplemental answers to St. Paul's inter-
rogatories. Since St. Paul did not submit any support-
ing affidavits and since summary judgment cannot be 
*/ 
granted if there are any disputed material facts,-
the factual allegations in the Bank's Complaint and the 
- Burningham v. Ott, Utah 2d , 525 P. 2d 620 
(1974) . 
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Bank's answers to interrogatories must be taken as 
true. That is, in order for St. Paul to be entitled to 
summary judgment, it must establish that as a matter of 
law the Bank could not prevail at trial on any of its 
causes of action even if all the factual allegations in 
the Complaint and Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 
are true. See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., Utah 
Supreme Court, No. 13925 (July 8, 1975); Tanner v. Utah 
Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 
(1961). The Bank, on the other hand, need only state.a 
cause of action in order to survive St. Paul's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Bank, however, can do better than that. In 
this section of the Argument the Bank will take up each 
of St. Paul's grounds advanced in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment and demonstrate why, under any or all of those 
grounds, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment 
and dismissal of the Complaint. 
A. A Check May be "Altered or Forged" By a 
Person Who Completes the Check in a Manner 
Otherwise than Authorized Regardless of 
Whether or not that Person is an Authorized 
Signatory. 
The Bank alleged in paragraphs 17, 21, 22, and 23 
of the Complaint against St. Paul that: "J. Moroni Stoof 
obtained, completed and materially altered said checks with-
-9-
out authorization," that such conduct constituted forgery 
and alteration and that, therefore, the settlement was a 
loss to the Bank through forgery and alteration. (R. 57, 
58) The defendant, however, moved to dismiss the Bank's 
claim of loss through forged or altered checks for 
"failure to state a claim" on the grounds that 
(1) the complaint does not allege J. Moroni Stoof 
and other signatories were not authorized signato-
ries to the checks drawn on Old National Bank of 
Washington and Clearfield State Bank, and hence the 
checks could not be forged checks, and in that (2) 
the complaint alleges said checks were signed in 
blank and hence were not altered checks. . . . 
(R. 34) 
Neither of these grounds entitles the defendant to 
summary judgment because under, applicable statutory author-
ity and case law, both checks were "altered" and/or "forged" 
within the meaning of those terms. And whatever vagueness or 
ambiguity there may be in these terms, such ambiguity must 
be construed in favor of the Bank since it is a fundamental 
principle of law that doubtful or ambiguous terms in insur-
ance policies are construed against the insurer and coiirts 
will construe such terms liberally "in favor of the insured 
to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken 
out." Tucker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 107 Utah 
478, 155 P.2d 173, 175 (1945); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of 
New York v. Reese, 223 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1955); St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. American Compounding Co., 
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211 Ala. 593, 100 So. 904 (1924). Moreover, "the words 
1
 bankerfs blanket bond1 are used to indicate a broad and 
liberal construction which is placed upon the terras and 
conditions of the insurance policy." St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co. v. Leflore Bank & Trust Go., 181 So.2d 
913 (Miss. 1966); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 482 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1971). 
Section 70A-3-407 of the Utah Code defines 
"alteration" as follows: 
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material-
which changes the contract of any party thereto 
in any respect, including any change in 
• • • • 
(b) an incomplete instrument, by com-
pleting it otherwise than authorized; or 
(c) the writing as signed by adding to 
it or removing any part of it. 
The Bank's Complaint alleges that Stoof took these 
checks and completed them otherwise than authorized. 
Thus, under the express terms of the statute the Bank'q 
Complaint on its face alleges facts which constitute 
"alteration." Therefore, defendant's argument that the 
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim because the "checks were signed in blank and hence 
were not altered checks" is clearly wrong and cannot have 
been a valid basis for dismissing the Complaint. Moreover, 
although unnecessary to defeat defendant's motion for dis-
-11-
m 
n 
missal for failure to state a claim, the facts in the 
i 
Record clearly show that at least one of the checks (the 
$32,500.00 check) was altered by J. Moroni Stoof within • 
the meaning of Section 70A-3-407 U.C.A. and that the other f 
i 
check also may have been altered (the $10,272.22 check) 
- i 
within the meaning of the Code. (R. 17) 
The bond issued by St. Paul, by the use of the 
conjunction "or," provides for recovery for any loss i 
suffered either through forgery o£ alteration. Thus, if ' 
the Bank's Complaint states a claim for loss through 
"alteration," it is not necessary that the Complaint also 
state a claim for loss through "forgery." 
Nevertheless, the Bank's Complaint on its face 
states a claim for loss through forgery because an author-
ized signatory can still be a forger. Thus, the trial court 
would be in error if it found, as defendant urged in its 
motion for dismissal, that because the Complaint does not 
allege that Stoof and the other signatory were not author-
ized signatories, the checks could not be forged checks. 
Courts have construed the term "forgery" to 
include both (1) the procurement of admittedly genuine 
signatures as a result of material misrepresentations 
concerning the instrument's content or purpose; or (2) 
the signing of the admittedly genuine or otherwise auth-
orized signature for an unauthorized purpose, usually by 
-12-
an agent to defraud its principal. Quick Service Box Co. 
v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 95 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 
1938); Turner v. Nicholson, 241 P. 750 (Okla. 1925); People 
v. Howard, 116 P.2d 802 (Cal. App. 1941). In Quick Service, 
for example, the court ruled in favor of the insured when 
it attempted to recover on its bond against losses through 
forgery where an office manager exceeded his authority to 
sign checks by making checks payable to fictitious persons 
or to cash. The court rejected the insurer's contention 
that there could be no forgery since the office manager 
had signed his own name. Thus, even if Stoof and the other 
signatory were authorized signatories to the checks which 
caused the Bank's loss, Stoof's actions with respect to 
both checks still constitute forgery. 
Some courts have concluded that the term 
"forgery" in insurance policies refers to those acts 
punishable under the crime of forgery and have held that 
acts similar to those committed by Stoof constitute 
J 
forgery. The Utah Penal Code in effect at the time of 
*/ 
~~ Provident Trust Co. v. National Surety Corp., 138 
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1943) (forgery committed even though 
signatures not actually forged); Quick Service Box Co. v. 
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 95 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1938); 
Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,482 P.2d 
193 (Cal. 1971) (forgery defined in criminal law sense, 
not in accordance with common usage); See, Hicks v. Georgia, 
168 S.E. 899, 87 A.L.R. 1166; People v. Kubanek, 370 111, 
646, 650, 19 N.E.2d 573 (1939) (filling in blanks other than 
as authorized constitutes forgery within the meaning of the 
Illinois statute; International Union Bank v. National 
Surety Co., 157 N.E. 269 (N.Y. 1927). 
-13-
Stooffs activities defined forgery to include both the 
altering and the passing of altered instruments— - acts 
which Stoof committed: 
Every person who with the intent to defraud 
another, falsely makes, alters; forges . . . 
any . . . check . . . or utters, publishes or 
passes, or attempts to pass, as true or genuine 
any of the above-named false, altered, forged 
. . . matters . . . knowing the same to be false, 
altered, forged or counterfeited with the intent 
to prejudice, damage or defraud or damage any 
person . . . is guilty of forgery. [Emphasis 
Added] 72-26-1 U.C.A. 
St. Paul chose the term forgery knowing the 
expansive definitions which have been given the term. 
Thus, since the Bank's Complaint alleges (and St. Paul 
does not and cannot dispute in seeking summary judgment) 
that Stoof altered the checks by completing them otherwise 
than authorized with the intent to defraud, the Complaint 
states a claim for loss through forgery. 
B, There is Ample Evidence in the Record 
That Stoof Altered or Forged the Checks 
Which Caused the Bank's Loss and in Any 
Event the Trial Court's Action in 
Granting Defendant's Motion Erroneously 
Cut Off an Opportunity for the Bank to 
Produce Such Evidence at Trial• 
-See, e.g. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 
656 where under an earlier but similar forgery statute, 
Gorham was convicted of knowingly passing a forged 
instrument. 
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In seeking dismissal of the Bank's claim of 
loss through forgery or altered checks under Insuring Clause 
11D", St, Paul in the alternative urged that summary judgment 
be granted because 
[P]laintiff's answers to interrogatories nos. 
1 and 2 dated April 19, 1974, plaintiff has no 
evidence or understanding how said checks were 
signed in blank, were forged, or were obtained, 
completed or materially altered without auth-
orization and through fraudulent misrepresen-
tation by J. Moroni Stoof.. (R. 34-35) 
There are at least three reasons why St. Paul's 
contention must be rejected. First, any basis that there 
may have been for granting summary judgment on this ground 
is no longer present since the trial court granted the 
plaintiff's motion for leave to supplement its answers to 
the interrogatories. (R. 8-9) Those supplemental answers 
state the Bank's understanding of Stoof's alteration or 
forgeries as obtained through discovery in the Clark 
Tank Lines suit. (R. 17) That evidence shows that J. 
Moroni Stoof took the $32,500.00 check which was signed 
in blank and wrongfully and without authority filled 
out the date, amount and payee of the check and deposited 
it in his personal account. Discovery in the Clark 
Tank Lines suit also indicates a serious evidentiary 
question as to whether J. Moroni Stoof likewise without 
authority filled in the amount and date of the $10,272.22 
check after it was delivered to him. (R. 17) 
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Secondly, whether the Bank had reason to believe 
that Stoof had altered or forged the checks is in essence 
a question of fact going to the Bankfs good faith in making 
settlement. Whether or not the Bank's good faith is at 
issue was not yet clear when the trial court granted sum-
*/ 
mary judgment. (R. 43-44)- But if such a factual question 
is controverted, a motion for summary judgment should not 
be granted. Trone v. Pacific Wholesale Supply Co., Utah 
Supreme Court, No. 13810 (April 28, 1975); Burningham v. 
Ott, Utah 2d , 525 P.2d 620 (1974). If the 
Bank's good faith is not disputed then summary judgment 
should be granted for the Bank. 6 Moore's Federal Practice 
1156.12. 
Thirdly, if the Bank, contrary to what it 
believes the law to be, is required to prove that J. M. 
Stoof in fact altered or forged the two checks, whether or 
not Stoof did. so may at best—' be a controverted factual 
—In answering Bank's Requests for Admissions that 
the settlement was in good faith, St. Paul answered: 
"Denied for lack of information or knowledge, reasonable 
inquiry having been made; the information known or readily 
obtainable is insufficient to enable admission or denial 
at this time, but there is no evidence now known which 
directly indicates the settlement was not in good faith." 
(R. 43-44) 
— W e say "at best" because it is uncontroverted in 
the record in its present posture that Stoof wrongfully 
completed the $32,500.00 check without authority. (R. 17) 
St. Paul has filed no counter affidavits or other evidence 
putting at issue the question of whether Stoof completed 
the $32,500.00 check without authority. 
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question. As noted above, for St. Paul to be entitled to 
summary judgment there must be no material factual 
questions in controversy. 
C. In Order to State a Claim for Loss Due to 
Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts of its Employees 
the Bank Need Only Allege that the Claims 
Against it in the Clark Tank Lines Suit, if 
Established, would Constitute Dishonest or 
Fraudulent Acts by or of its Employees And 
to Hold Otherwise Would Greatly Discourage 
Settlements. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Bank's claims of 
loss under Insurance Clause "A" 
For failure to state a claim, in that the Second 
Cause of Action does not allege loss by reason 
of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act 
of any employee of plaintiff nor does it allege 
any employee of plaintiff converted funds, paid 
such checks in bad faith with the actual knowledge 
of Stoof's lack of authority, or aided and 
abetted Stoof. (R. 35). 
In advancing this ground for dismissing the 
Complaint as to Clause "A", St. Paul is taking a slightly 
different tact from its arguments as to Clause "D"• 
St. Paul did not argue that if the acts allegedly com-* 
mitted by the Bank's employees actually occurred, such 
*/ 
acts would not constitute a "dishonest"-7 or "fraudulent" 
— The Clark Tank Lines complaint alleged that the 
Bank paid these checks in "bad faith." This Court has 
held that bad faith alone implies dishonesty. Sugarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 
440 P.2d 869 (1968)" 
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act under Clause "A" of the bond. St* Paul implicitly 
concedes that. Rather St. Paul argued that the Bank 
did not state a claim because the Bank did not allege 
that these dishonest or fraudulent acts of the Bank's 
employees in fact occurred. This cannot be the law. 
Whether or not the Bank's employees paid the checks in 
bad faith with actual knowledge of Stoof's lack of 
authority or aided and abetted Stoof in his embezzlements 
from Clark Tank Lines was at issue in the Clark Tank 
Lines suit. That suit was settled without any resolution 
of whether or not these dishonest or fraudulent acts 
occurred. Surely the Bank as the insured cannot be 
required to go through the charade of trying the lawsuit 
it settled (and this time against itself) in order to 
recover for a settlement of claims against it which, if 
established, would clearly constitute a loss recoverable 
under Insuring Clause "A" of the bond. Such a require-
ment would put insureds in an impossible position since 
one reason for settlement is that both sides are not 
certain of their proof. 
'•Thus, the courts have consistently held that 
where a claim is made against the insured which, if 
established, falls within the scope of the policy, the 
insurer is bound to pay the amount of any settlement made 
in good faith by the insured. Couch on Insurance 2nd 
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§51:54; St. Louis Dress Beef and Provision Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 201 U.S. 173 (1906); Hardware Mutual Cas-
ualty Co. v. Hildebrand, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir., 1941); 
Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 330 
P.2d 432, 440 (Cal. App. 1958) . 
In Rus s-FleId, for example, the court found that: 
[b]y the terms of the instant contract the 
insurer was not obligated to defend the in-
sured against asserted claims. But when the 
insurer denied coverage and disclaimed the 
. liability, the insured acquired the right to 
make any reasonable and bona fide compromise 
of the claim against it. Ritchie v. Anchor 
Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App.2d 245, 258, 268 
P.2d 1000; Lamb v. Bell Casualty Co., 3 Cal. 
App.2d 624, 630, 40 P.2d 311. Id. at 440. 
Like the insurer in Russ-Field, St. Paul was not obli-
gated to defend the Bank in its defense of the claims 
against it in the Clark Tank Lines suit, although St. Paul 
had the option to do so. (R. 64) But having declined 
to defend the insured and the insured having settled the 
claim, "it was not necessary for the trial court to find 
that . . . [the insured had in fact committed an act covered 
under the policy] in order to find a loss for which the 
appellant [the insurer] was liable." M . at 440-441. 
Thus, the Bank has satisfied its burden of alleging 
in its Complaint that claims were made against it, which, if 
established, would have constituted a loss through dishonesty 
of its employees and that it settled these claims. To 
-19-
require, as defendant's position would require, that the 
insured could only recover from its insurer if the insured 
had a judgment entered against it for claims covered by the 
policy (or at least was positive enough that the allegations 
against it were true so that it would be willing to allege 
them as true in its complaint against the insured company to 
recover any settlement costs) would obviously provide the 
insured with very little incentive to compromise. Courts 
have frequently recognized the policy favoring settlements 
or compromises of lawsuits. Williams v. First National Bank, 
216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Moses Echo Co. v. Roscoe-Ajax Corp., 
320 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir., 1963). Settlements avoid waste 
of time and resources and often provide the parties with a 
more satisfactory result than if they had "won" after long 
and expensive litigation. Moreover, a failure to settle 
could cause an even greater liability for both the insured 
and the insurer should the insured be found liable for the 
claims against it. An insured should not be forced to /take 
this risk, and since the insurer bears the ultimate risk, it 
would seem contrary to the insurer's interest to be urging a 
position to this Court which would increase this risk. 
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D. The Bank Need Not Have Personal Knowledge 
That Its Employees Committed Dishonest or 
Fraudulent Acts, in Order to Recover from 
St. Paul the Amount Paid by the Bank in 
Settlement of Such Claims. 
In moving to dismiss the Bank's claims of loss 
under Insuring Clause "A", defendant moved in the 
alternative: 
Upon summary judgment, in that by answers to 
interrogatories nos. 3, 4,5, and 6 dated 
April 19, 1974, plaintiff admits it had no 
knowledge of which employees, and does not 
allege any employees, of plaintiff acted in 
bad faith and with actual knowledge of 
Stoof's lack of authority, aided and abetted 
Stoof, converted funds or were dishonest, 
fraudulent or acted or committed criminal 
acts with respect to the loss claimed. (R. 35) 
As with defendant's arguments supporting sum-
mary judgment for Bank's claims of loss under Insuring 
Clause "D" based on the Bank's Answers to Interrogatories 
dated April 19, 1974, any basis for granting summary judg-
ment on such grounds has been removed by the Bank's 
supplemental answers. In its Supplemental Answers to 
Interrogatories, the Bank through its counsel stated 
that counsel for Clark Tank Lines gave it reason to 
believe that there was sufficient evidence to justify 
allegations of dishonesty but that the lawsuit was 
settled prior to any discovery as to the basis of these 
allegations. (R. 18) Moreover, as demonstrated above, 
it is not necessary for the Bank to have personal 
knowledge that the allegations against it are true. It 
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is enough that claims were made against the Bank, which 
if established against it would constitute a recoverable 
loss under Insuring Clause "A" and that the Bank settled 
such claims. As with the Bank's claim for recovering for 
a loss under Insuring Clause "D", the question of the 
Bank's good faith in making this settlement, even assuming 
it is an issue, cannot be resolved on a motion for summary 
judgment. Likewise, if the Bank, contrary to what it 
Hbelieves the law to be, is required to prove that the Bank's 
employees acted dishonestly, then whether or not the 
employees did so may also be a controverted factual ques-
tion. 
i 
E. The Trial Court's Dismissal and Granting 
of Summary Judgment Must be Reversed if i 
the Bank Has Stated a Claim for a Loss 
Under Either Clause "D" or Clause "A". * 
This Court need only find that the Bank stated 
i 
a claim for loss under either Insuring Clause "D" (ALTER-
" i 
ATION OR FORGERY) or "A11 (Dishonesty) in order for this
 t 
Court to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judg- , 
ment. It is not necessary for this Court to find that 
i the Bank has stated a claim for loss under both clauses. 
This is especially true since no statement or finding was 
made in the Clark Tank Lines settlement allocating the
 v 
amount of settlement among the various causes of action. « 
i 
Where no allocation is made of the settlement amount 
i 
i 
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i 
between claims against the insured, some of which were 
covered by the policy and some of which were not, the 
insurer is liable for the entire sum. St/ Paul Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co. v; Icard, Merrill, Cullis & Timm, 
196So.2d 219 (Fla. 1967); Couch on Insurance, §51:54. 
F. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary 
Judgment Because the Evidence Would Sus-
tain a Finding That the Bank Suffered 
Loss Due to "Larceny11 by Stoof Which is 
Recoverable under Clause "B" of the 
bond. 
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Guaranty Bank 
& Trust Co. , 370 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1966) the court held, 
in a fact situation very similar to the instant case, that 
Guaranty Bank suffered loss through larceny and was entitled 
to indemnification by the insurer under Cluase "Blf~ (identi-
cal to Clauses of the St. Paul bond), There, the office 
manager of the drawer (Sandler-ette) wrongfully cashed 172 
of the drawer's checks aided by the apparent negligence of 
Guaranty's employees. As in the instant case, the office 
manager had no authority to negotiate the checks in the 
manner in which he did. Similarly, Guaranty was sued by 
-'Clause "B" covers 
any loss of Property through robbery, common-law 
or statutory larceny . . . whether effected with 
or without violence or with or without negligence 
on the part of any of the Employees . . . . 
(R. 66) 
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the drawer, the insurer refused to assume the defense and 
Guaranty settled with the drawer- Id. at 277-280. The 
court held that the settlement constituted a loss through 
forgery finding that every time the office manager wrong-
fully cashed the checks, "the bank paid out its money." 
Id. at 280. 
During the time period of Stoof's alleged 
activities, the Utah Code defined larceny as "the 
felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving 
*/ 
away the personal property of another." §76-38-1— There 
is uncontroverted evidence in the record that Stoof 
wrongfully caused the Clark Tank Lines checks to be 
deposited in his account at the Bank and that Stoof later 
wrote and caused to be presented to the Bank checks on 
the resulting funds in his account. (R-E. 62-63) Stoof's 
causing the Bank to pay the checks he wrote on his account 
at the Bank is no less larceny than the Sandler-ette office 
manager's wrongful cashing of his employer's checks. Both 
are a felonious taking of the Bank's money. Under Rule 
15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Bank is 
entitled to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence 
and such amendment may be made "even after judgment." 
~ This Section was later repealed. §76-10-1401 U.C.A. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ST. PAUL BECAUSE THE BANK 
IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADING 
UNLESS ST. PAUL DISPUTES THE BANK'S GOOD FAITH IN 
MAKING SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE BANK. 
As demonstrated above, the pleadings alone were 
enough to defeat St. Paul's motion for dismissal and 
summary judgment. But the pleadings, combined with other 
evidence in the Record, establish more than that. Discovery 
in the Clark Tank Lines suit shows that J. M. Stoof com-
pleted a $32,500.00 check otherwise than authorized and 
may have similarly completed a $10,272.22 check. (R.
 p17) 
As a matter of law, these acts of Stoof constitute 
forgery and/or alteration. (See pp. 8-13, supra) Had the 
Clark Tank Lines suit not been settled and had the Bank 
been found liable, the judgment entered against the 
Bank would have been a "loss through forgery or alteration 
of, on or in any check" which St. Paul agreed to indemnify 
against in Insuring Clause "D". (R. 67) This would be 
so whether or not there were other contributing factors, 
including the Bank's negligence which caused the Bank to 
be found liable. Thus, in Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of 
Troy v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 218 N.Y.S. 
332, 218 App. Div. 455 (1922), the court construed 
"through" in a Banker's Blanket Bond to mean "by means 
of, as a consequence of, or by reason of," and held that 
it applied to direct or indirect causation. 
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Likewise it is clear that if the claims against 
the Bank that the Bank's employees fraudulently or dis-
honestly aided and abetted Stoof in his embezzlement had 
been established at the Clark Tank Lines trial, any judgment 
entered against the Bank would have constituted a valid and 
collectible loss under Insuring Clause "A" ("Dishonesty") 
of the St. Paul bond. 
Thus, if the Bank had been found liable in the 
Clark Tank Lines suit and any judgment entered against it, 
this would have been a valid and collectible loss under 
Clauses "A" and "D". St. Paul's liability to the Bank 
cannot be any different simply because the Bank settled 
these claims, unless St. Paul can establish that the 
Bank's settlement was not in good faith. To hold 
otherwise would put any insured in an impossible situation. 
As in this case, what more could the Bank have done? 
St. Paul admits that it was fully informed of the 
proceedings in the Clark Tank Lines suit, that it 
refused to undertake the Bank's defense, and that it 
refused to counsel the Bank as to whether to accept the 
settlement. Insurers simply cannot be allowed to 
escape liability because the insured takes the judicially 
encouraged settlement course rather than consume its 
own (and the judicial system's) resources in a long and 
expensive lawsuit. St. Paul, by refusing to assume the 
-26-
Bank's defense, took the risk that the Bank would 
settle claims which the Bank might have been able to 
defend against successfully at trial. Having taken 
that risk St. Paul cannot be heard to say that the 
claims could have been beaten back at trial or that the 
Bank must prove the claims against itself in order to 
recover from St. Paul. 
St. Paul's only possible defense to the Bank's 
claims against it under Insuring Clauses lfAn and "D". is that 
the Bank's settlement was not in good faith. Thus, this 
Court should reverse the judgment below and remand the 
case with instructions that the trial court determine 
whether the question of the Bank's good faith is at 
issue. If the Bank's good faith is not at issue the 
trial court should be directed to enter judgment for 
the Bank. If the Bank's good faith is at issue the 
trial court should be directed to conduct further 
proceedings solely on that issue. 
III. EVEN IF ST. PAUL IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UNDER CLAUSES "A" AND "D" OR EVEN IF THE SETTLE- . 
MENT WAS NOT IN GOOD FAITH, THE BANK IS ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN 
DEFENSE OF THE CLARK TANK LINES SUIT. 
The St. Paul bond provides that in addition to 
recovery for other losses under the bond, St. Paul will 
indemnify the Bank against court costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees 
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incurred and paid by the insured in defending any 
suit or legal proceedings brought against the 
insured to enforce the insured's liability or 
alleged liability on account of any loss, claim or 
damage which, if established, against the insured, 
would constitute a valid and collectible loss 
sustained by the insured under the terms of this 
bond. (R. 6 4) [Emphasis added] 
Thus, whether or not the Bank's settlement with Clark 
Tank Lines was in good faith, the claims against it, 
if established, would, as demonstrated above, have 
constituted a "valid and collectible loss." Therefore, 
even if this Court holds that the Bank, before it can 
collect the amount of settlement from St. Paul, must 
prove that Stoof in fact altered or forged the checks or 
that the Bank's employees acted dishonestly, the Bank is 
still entitled to recover its attorneys1 fees, since at 
least the Bank's alleged liability in the Clark Tank Lines 
*/ 
suit was within the scope of the bond.— This is so even if 
there is a settlement where the insured's ultimate liability 
may or may not have been covered by the policy depending on 
the outcome of the trial. Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:143, 
50 A.L.R.2d 458, 506; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 
v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69, 71 (Ore. 197.0) ; St. 
—'Likewise, the possibility existed that the 
Bank's loss was due to Stoof's larceny and thus covered 
under Clause "B" (Larceny). See Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., supra, 370 F.2d 276. 
(See pp. 22-23, supra) 
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Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Clarence-Raines & Co*, 
335 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1972) . 
I n
 Crosetti Bros., the shoe was on the other 
foot. There St. Paul was contending that Crosetti 
Brothers, as indemnitor, was liable for attorney's fees 
incurred by St. Paul in settling claims, one of which was 
within the scope of the Crosetti indemnity agreement. 
Whether Crosetti Brothers was liable for indemnification 
depended on the manner in which the insured was liable 
to a third party. But the question of how, let alone 
whether, the insured was liable to the third party was 
never determined since the claim was settled. In fact, 
the court granted St. Paul recovery for attorneys1 fees 
and costs from Crosetti Brothers even though under the 
terms of the settlement, St. Paul did not even have to 
pay a third party anything (the other defendant did). 
Moreover, even if it can be argued that some of 
the claims against the Bank were outside the scope of 
the Banker's Blanket Bond, it has been held that there 
is no need to allocate attorneys' fees between claims 
within the Banker's Blanket Bond coverage and those 
outside the bond coverage. See St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Kodor, 200 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1967). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Continental Bank and Trust Company respect-
fully urges this Court to reverse the trial court's grant 
of Summary Judgment and Dismissal and its denial of plain-
tiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief 
from Judgment on the following grounds: 
(1) None of the grounds advanced before 
the trial court in urging Summary Judgment and < 
dismissal are legally sufficient to sustain the 
i 
trial court's action. . 
i 
(2) The trial court erred in denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and • 
for Relief from Judgment because any possible basis « 
for granting Summary Judgment had been removed by 
the admission into the Record of plaintiff's Supple-
mental Answers to Interrogatories. 
(3) Plaintiff, not defendant, is entitled • 
to judgment on the face of the pleadings unless * 
defendant puts in issue the factual question of the 
plaintiff's good faith in settling the claims against 
the plaintiff. 
(4) Plaintiff is entitled to recover its 
attorneys' fees and costs even if it must prove, i 
and cannot prove, that Stoof altered or forged 
i 
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the checks or that the Bank's employees acted 
dishonestly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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